I INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE (DUTCH) SCENE.
This report, prepared for the COM-2 project of the European Community's FAST Research programme, presents a view of the Dutch developments of modern transmission facilities for the suppliers of media and their various users. By "transmission facilities II we shall understand electronic means of providing intermediary connection(s) between suppliers and users for the transport of audio or video programmes, general information and any related transactional signalling; we thus exclude pure physical transport (e.g. distribution of signs on paper or compact disc). IlModernli facilities are taken to be those which do more than support terrestrial broadcast services (over the air) or teZephone and ~re' services (these classical public services being available in the Netherlands for more than half a century).
It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the Netherlands have some 14 million inhabitants and the highest density of population in the EC (344 per km 2 , thus exceeding even Japan). In 1980, both import and exports of goods and services for the first time exceeded 50% of the Gross Domestic Product -a factor 5 or 6 higher than for the US or Japan, and twice that of the EC average. This international orientation profoundly influences Dutch professional and personal abilities, without however dominating the political, cultural and social traditions:
the democratic structure is still set up to accommodate several classical "pillars" of an outspoken religious or ideological nature [1] . Public decision-making is based on an unusual measure of egalitarian participation and is obviously no simple matter in so pluralistic circumstances. Evolving conflicts in modern society which cannot be resolved fast enough in parliament, are frequently settled in court.
Is this of importance for the present investigation of transmission facilities for modern media, which would seem mainly an assessment of technology development? It must not be forgotten that there are strong pubLic interests involved in this course, inter alia because of
• national media policy, protective of broadcast and press traditions;
• the vast capital already invested in public communication infrastructures (CATV and PTT networks), amounting to some 15 Milliard Dutch Guilders in the Netherlands;
• employment in the (public-utility) sectors responsible for most communications infrastructures in the Netherlands;
• industrial policy for the promising IT-sector (with the Dutch multinational Philips);
• privacy issues;
• copyright issues, both national and international in scope:
• education and science policy, e.g. in relation to teaching and research networks (the Netherlands provide the international secretariate for RARE, under the aegis of EUREKA) ;
• the (re-)definition of PTT monopolies, especially for new information services.
While any European government is becoming saddled with a similar set of conflicting policy problems, the Dutch have a comparatively longer exposure: Discussion about broadband CATV networks has been fierce since their inception more than 15 years ago [2] , and the status and the power of the Dutch PTT have been in question almost permanently since the Second World War [3] . There is ample evidence of the impact of 2) use for decision-making in a given private or professional function, whether commercial or not, including transactional use.
The former category is the extension of the general popular or social uses of classical media; it therefore has the ear of the powers that be. They must therefore invoke a collective antenna system of some kind for DBS reception; Dutch wideband operators will rather prosper than perish by this.
The real threat to present CATV operations will arise when integration with narrowband services in one subscriber network (using optical technology) becomes economically viable. This situation is dealt with in Section v.
Market developments
The Dutch tradition developed in cable provision is one of heavy involvement by municipalities or their public-utility providers (gas and water companies). More than 85% of CATV franchises has been granted to municipal authorities or to foundations with municipal control. These It is expected that segmented offerings of a few permanent programme packages can be made with relatively simple (static) filtering techniques in the mini-star points. However, the substantial capital costs of the network cannot suddenly be parcelled out proportionally, without resulting in major dissatisfaction of users so long accustomed to a fixed flat subscription rate.
Cross-subsidization of new local (cable) programmes by channel rentals received from pay-TV companies, or from the international providers of international satellite-carried programmes, is planned in some municipalities. However, the commercial success of the former and the willingness of the latter sources have yet to be proved; so far, no significant revenues have accrued to Dutch CATV companies from the ppovideps of the programmes or services carried.
Summing up the financial situation and lI marketing" approach of Dutch CATV network providers, their precarious position as a carrier, i.e.,
an intermediary between large programme providers (outside their own control) and users at large (looking for the purposes of Category 1 mentioned in Section I, and for technical quality and cost-effective reception), has been decisive. Their position was developed in the 1970's, before the notion or feasibility of new information services (Category 2 in Section I) was sufficiently generally appreciated to -9 -allow political acceptance of a more active involvement in this field [2] . Accordingly, CATV in the Netherlands has been regulated as a form of broadcast activity. Hence the A (for ~tenna), and hence the restricted scope of the regulations in force.
Technical regulations for broadband cable networks
Franchising for collective "antenna installations" • a (favourable) hearing of the local authorities;
• agreement with (mild) technical recommendations [6] ; and adherence to the specific administrative and technical conditions in force;
• acceptance of PTT-provision of certain (trunk) faCilities, against payment;
• sufficient evidence of technical and financial competence of the applicant;
• compliance with the relevant (content) regulations of the Broadcasting Act for regional programmes and for cable programming (see below) i
• payment (to the PTT) of administrative costs. CCITT.
The operational significance of being able to reach local CATV networks through a digital PTT network is dependent upon regulatory developments.
Technically, it will be possible to deliver digital services to CATV networks allover the Netherlands as from 1988.
Market developments
The • divestiture of telecommunications oligopolies in the US;
• privatisation of state-owned operating companies in the UK and Japan;
• structural separation of information processing and transport sectors;
• open competition in the supply of customer-premise equipment and information processing services with "added value", relative to the public service;
• a measure of competition in providing transmission channels for information transport, consistent with the national interpretation of the "public interest".
These five international trends have not always been clearly distinguished
~n the nat~onal Dutch debate [3] . Yet they have contributed to a better understanding of the necessity to study not only the tasks and functions of the PTT [10), but more recently also its status (as a government department) and structure (as a regulator, a monopoly provider of public utilities, and a competitor with private enterprises).
In January 1984, a Government White Paper stated: "Further reflection on the status and structure of the PTT should not concentrate solely on its present functioning -which is found to be basically sound in terms of technology and organisation -but should be addressed to future [19] developments". The Government requested Dr. Steenbergen, an economist with senior executive experience in corporate automation, to chair a committee addressing the future status and structure of the Dutch PTT.
He proceeded to set up a study which broke with several traditions in Dutch political life:
1. Rather than reflecting the many "pillars II and diverse conunercial interests in the Dutch society, the Steenbergen COmmittee consisted of only three independent experts, supported by a professional secretariate.
\ will be completely abolished.
All shares of PTT Ltd. will be held by the State. At the press conference following the cabinet decision on November 22, the Prime Minister, Mr.
Ruud Lubbers, saw no purpose in later selling the shares on the stock market: The principal goal will be a more independent and flexible PTT enterprise, not privatisation which would only diminish the -very substantial -annual revenues enjoyed from the Dutch PTT (Fig. 1) .
However, in order to reverse the present declining investment trend, PTT Ltd. will be granted access to foreign capital On market conditions. • PTT employees will cease to be civil servants in 1989. This will permit the salary adjustments necessary to recruit and keep more specialists and commercial staf~ necessary for successful innovation;
• the telecommunications licence granted to PTT Ltd. will impose an obligation to provide leased lines (both narrowband and wideband) on request. Third-party traffic (resale) with added value will be allowed, subject to a permit from ORP;
• the Government will be advised on infrastructural policy matters by a (small) Telecommunications Council;
• PTT Ltd. is to consult a body of users and suppliers about its future plans and public services;
• all proposed measures will be carried out together, as one package deal.
Assessing these specific Dutch developments in the light of the five international liberalisation trends outlined above, the following picture emerges:
• Unlike AT&T, the PTT will not be subjected to the exigencies of divestiture. The Dutch economies of scale do not even amount to those of one large American state, let alone all the United States.
• Unlike British Telecom, the ownership of the PTT will not be privatized.
However, PTT Ltd. will enjoy a legal status separate from the government executive, with the rights and obligations of a company governed by private law.
• Structural separation between those subsidiary PTT companies serving the l'inal analysis. will be expected to cover these costs?
-Do you consider DBS to be financially feasible? What is your proE nosis ?
